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Dandy Don is a music lover. He listens to and composes music constantly;
occasionally his songs are even broadcast over the radio. One evening Don
went for dinner at Kate's Cajun Kitchen, a small local eatery. At the restaurant,
Don was pleased to hear Kate's radio tuned to his favorite station, WXYZ. Don
became even happier when the station played "I'm No Greenhorn," a song he
had written and held the copyright in. Don had his drink, his meal, and his
music-he was delighted.
But Don's mood soon changed as he remembered that the copyright he
holds in "I'm No Greenhorn" gives him control over all public performances of
that song. Realizing that his song was being performed publicly, Don
immediately demanded to speak to Kate-
Don asked her, "Do you have a license?"
"Excuse me. A license for what?" she replied.
"Well, you just publicly performed my song, where is your license?" he said.
"A license? A performance? All I did was turn on the radio!" Kate cried.1
* This Note received Second Place in the 1996 Nathan Burkan Memorial Writing
Competition sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers at
The Ohio State University College of Law.
**The author thanks his family and friends, particularly his father, for their
unconditional support and unshakable confidence.
I Many restaurants, bars, and other commercial establishments have radios and
televisions that provide entertainment for customers. Although this hypothetical uses the radio
as an example, also within the scope of this Note is a business proprietor who shows a
sporting event or other programming on a television.
A closely related issue is the legal effect of a business proprietor playing a purchased
copy of a work, such as a videocassette or a compact disc, for patrons. This activity is
considered a primary transmission, and there is currently little, if any, debate that it requires a
license. See Irving Berlin Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1929) ("[Ihe provision
conferring... the exclusive right of publicly performing... contains nothing which can be
given the effect of excepting a public performance for profit by means of a phonograph
record."); see also David E. Shipley, Copyright Law and Your Neighborhood Bar and Grill:
Recent Developments in Performance Rights and the Section 110(5) Exemption, 29 AIz. L.
REv. 475, 514 (1987) ("Congress clearly provided a discrete exemption for small commercial
establishments... to freely provide standard televisions and radios .... It is equally clear,
however, that this exemption has no application to records or videocassette tapes performed
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Under the current copyright law, Kate has a problem.2
Dandy Don, like all copyright owners, enjoys five exclusive rights,3
including the performance right.4 This performance right gives copyright
publicly in such establishments."). Although this issue is not discussed in this Note, the
imposition of liability against the proprietor for copyright infringement in this situation is not
beyond attack.
2 This hypothetical is used throughout the Note to illustrate various points of law and
policy. The hypothetical is also intended to show that the law involved here might not be what
most people would expect or what they would think is fair. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive
Right to Read, 13 CARDOzO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 29, 50 (1994) ("[S]ome prospective licensees
fail to buy licenses because they believe the law could not possibly have been intended to
apply to their situation .... ").
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Generally, the exclusive rights are the reproduction right
(§ 106(1)), the right to prepare derivative works (§ 106(2)), the right to distribute (§ 106(3)),
the right to perform the work publicly (§ 106(4)), and the right to display the work publicly
(§ 106(5)).
The reproduction right involves the exclusive right of the copyright owner to make
copies of his or her copyrighted work. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946),
(holding that for the plaintiff to show that the defendant infringed this right, the copyright
owner must demonstrate that the defendant copied the work and that the copying amounted to
an improper appropriation); see also the leading commentary on copyright law, MELMLLE B.
NIMM & DAViD NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02, at 8-28 (1995).
The right to prepare derivative works gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to
make works that derive themselves from the copyrighted work. For example, a movie based
on a play is a derivative work of that play. Under § 106(2), the right to create such a
derivative work belongs exclusively to the copyright owner. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988), (holding that when defendant
purchases a book that contains plaintifs paintings, removes the paintings from the book,
pastes the paintings on ceramic tiles, and offers the tiles for sale, defendant infringes the
plaintiffs exclusive right to prepare derivative works); see also NmmmR, supra, § 8.09, at 8-
123.
The copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute the work publicly gives him control
over whether he will sell, rent, lease, or lend the work to another. However, once a particular
work, whether it is a copy or the original, is distributed by the copyright owner, the "first sale
doctrine," 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982), curtails the copyright owner's control of further
distribution of that particular copy or original. For example, a copyright owner only has the
exclusive right to release a manuscript-he cannot be forced to sell it. Once the copyright
owner distributes that manuscript, the subsequent owner has the right to further distribute that
copy of the manuscript. However, the subsequent owner has no right to make copies of the
manuscript just because he owns a copy of it. See C.M. Paula Company v. Logan, 355 F.
Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (discussing the interaction between the distribution right and the
right to prepare derivative works); see also NnIMAm, supra, § 8.11, at 8-135 to -141 (1995).
For a discussion of the right to perform the work publicly, see infra notes 4-7 and
accompanying text; see also NMMER, supra, § 8.14, at 8-186 to -192.5.
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owners the exclusive right "to perform [their] copyrighted work[s] publicly." 5
In other words, copyright owners have the right to exclude all others from
performing the owner's copyrighted work in public. 6 Contrary to what the label
might suggest, the performance right is not concerned with the copyright
owner's right to perform his or her own work.7
The question then becomes, what constitutes a "public performance"? It is
well established that a radio or television station performs a work publicly when
it broadcasts a signal.8 Thus, WXYZ publicly performed Don's song by
The display right is the copyright owner's exclusive right to display the copyrighted
work publicly. This right is provided to copyrighted works, other than sound recordings and
works of architecture. See Mura v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (explaining that where defendant displayed plaintiff's puppets on the television show
"Captain Kangaroo" for thirty seconds there is no infringement); Streeter v. Rolfe, 491 F.
Supp. 416 (W.D. La. 1980) (discussing what is a "public" display); see also NvMMER, supra,
§ 8.20, at 8-278 to -283.
4 Strictly speaking, not all copyright holders are provided with the performance right.
See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
5 17 U.S.C. § 106, which is titled "Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works" (emphasis
added). Therefore, while a broadcast of x in your home is a performance, it does not violate
any right of a copyright holder because it is not a public performance.
6 The right to exclude is common in the law of property. See Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (establishing that the right of exclusion flows
naturally from the ownership of property and is nearly absolute); Morris R. Cohen, Property
and Sovereignty, 13 CoRat'L L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) ("MIhe essence of private property is
always the right to exclude others.").
7 The copyright owner is free to perform his copyrighted work, not to perform it, or to
license another to perform it, but she cannot be compelled to do any of these. Compare this to
the patent system, in which nonuse of the subject of a potential patent will result in forfeiture
of the right to obtain a patent. See generally Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307
U.S. 5 (1939).
8 This rule developed very soon after the advent of radio. See Susan A. Maslow,
Comment, "Watts" the Perimeter of the Doctrine of the Communication of a Radio Broadcast
Under Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act?, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 1056, 1064 (1982) ("The
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) had little difficulty
holding radio broadcasters accountable for copyright infringement."); see also M. Witmark
& Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923) (stating that a radio station's
broadcasting is public and for profit); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto.
Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411,412 (6th Cir. 1925) ("Radio broadcasting is intended to, and in
fact does, reach a very much larger number of the public at the moment of the rendition than
any other medium of performance.").
It is also undisputed that the owner of a radio or television who invites friends into her
home to listen to a radio or watch a television broadcast does not violate any right of the
copyright holder because the performance is not public. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 196 (1931); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
1997]
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broadcasting it. But should Kate be deemed to have performed Don's song
when she tuned to WXYZ and played the radio for her customers? The current
law answers the question affirmatively. As the law now stands, "any individual
is performing whenever he or she... communicates the performance by
turning on a receiving set." 9 Therefore, Kate performed Don's song by turning
on her radio and performed it publicly by playing it for her customers. Because
Don has the exclusive right to perform his song publicly, under the current law,
Kate has violated Don's copyright.
Looking at the current law, this Note examines the liabilities of business
proprietors in Kate's position and discusses why change is needed and how that
change can be achieved. Part I presents background of the performance right,
discusses the current law, and presents recent proposals in Congress to change
the law. In Part Im, this Note details the inadequacies of the current scheme,
revealing why change is needed. Part IV turns towards finding a solution by
examining how the word "performance" has been defined. This Part details the
Supreme Court's definitions of performance and how Congress has interpreted
the Court's decisions. Additionally, Part IV proposes a new definition of
performance that would alleviate the problems of the current system. By
following the proposed change set forth in this Note, the law would allow
business proprietors to freely play radio and television programming for patrons
while maintaining the integrity and value of the copyright.
417, 469 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (holding that turning on a television set in the
privacy of one's home also results in a "performance," although not a public performance).
Whether a performance at a quasi-public gathering, such as a wedding, is "public" within the
terms of the copyright law is unclear.
9 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5677.
Receiving sets are radios or televisions. Thus, any act that transmits an initial performance is
a performance under the 1976 Act; a performance is transmitted when it is communicated "by
any device or process whereby images or sound are received beyond the place from which
they are sent." Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of transmit); Darlene A. Cote,
Chipping Away at the Copyright Owner's Rights: Congress' Continued Reliance on the
Compulsory License, 2 J. fr.rnL. PROP. L. 219, 219 (1994).
A maze of copyright regulations and substantial royalty fees paid to the copyright owners
of the broadcasts make public performances more than a simple flick of the power
button. In order to present these copyrighted broadcasts to the public the [proprietor]




II. BACKGROUND OF THE PERFORMANCE RIGHT
A. Brief History of the Performance Right
The performance right is by no means a recent development.' 0 The right
existed at common law" and was first codified in the United States in the 1856
Copyright Act for dramatic works. 12 Forty years later the performance right
was extended to copyright holders in musical works. 13 In 1909, Congress
completely revised the copyright law, adding a "for profit" requirement to the
performance right.14 The for profit requirement restricted copyright owners'
control only to those performances by others which were done for profit.Is
10 See Ralph Oman, The Copyright Clause: A Charter for a Living People, in
CEmRATING THE Bic enm OF THE UNiTED STATS CONSTrITTION 85, 85 (ABA 1988)
("[In the United States, we made copyright a part of the organic law of the land, and it has
been with us every step of the way."). For a more thorough discussion of the performance
right, see generally NamER, supra note 3, at §§ 8.14-.19 at 8-182 to -277; 2 WLIAM F.
PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, 875-904 (1994).
11 See PATRY, suqpra note 10, at 878-80 (tracing the original performance right to the
French revolutionary laws of 1791 and to the United States, where "the common law granted
authors a right to prohibit the unauthorized public performance of their unpublished works").
12 See Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138-39 (1856) (repealed 1870).
13 See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (1897). The performance right under the
1897 statute, though, was rarely enforced by copyright holders because many of them
believed that performances would encourage listeners to purchase their sheet music, the sale
of which would ultimately be to their benefit. Also, enforcement of the performance right was
difficult since an effective enforcement mechanism was not available until ASCAP was
formed in 1914. See John Kernochan, Music Performing Rights Organizations in the United
States of America: Special Characteristics, Restraints, and Public Attitudes, 10 COLuM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTs 333, 336 (1986). Whether public performances of a work benefit the copyright
holder by popularizing the work is a debate which continues today. See ALAN LATMAN, THE
COPYRIGHT LAW: HOwEL's CoYPYRIGHT LAw REvISE AND THE 1976 AcT 182 (5th ed.
1979); PATRY, supra note 10, at 880; Bernard Korman, Performance Rights in Music Under
Sections 110 and 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 521, 523-24
(1977).
14 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)); see also PATRY, supra note 10, at 881.
15 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)). Owners of copyright in dramatic works, however, were granted
in section 1(d) of the act the exclusive right to control any public performance, regardless of
whether or not it was for profit. See id.; see also NmmEm, supra note 3, § 8.15[A], at 8-
192.14 to -15 (explaining the rationale for the distinction between the scope of the
performance right for dramatic works in section l(d) and for nondramatic musical and literary
works in sections 1(c) and (e)).
19971
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
B. The Performance Right Under the 1976 Copyright Act
The 1976 Copyright Act supplanted the 1909 Act and is the presiding
statutory copyright law in the United States. 16 The 1976 Act continues to
provide copyright owners with the performance right17 by giving them control
over performances' 8 of their works which are made publicly.19 The
Under the 1909 Act, public performance meant performances done for a profit. See Act
of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
810 (1982)). The Supreme Court examined the "for profit" requirement in Herbert v. Shanley
Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917). In that case, the Court ruled that when an orchestra employed by
the defendant hotel performed in the hotel's dining room for the entertainment of diners, the
copyright holder's performance right was violated. The Court ruled that the fact that the hotel
did not charge the customers an admission fee to hear the orchestra was no defense for the
hotel. See id. at 593-94. Finally, in 1952, the 1909 Copyright Act was amended to extend the
performance right to nondramatic literary works.
16 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
17 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
18 To perform a work means "to recite, render, play, dance or act it, whether directly or
by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of perform). Thus, one performs when one sings a song or plays
a recording of a song on a compact disc or plays a tape of a movie on a video cassette
recorder. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that the playing of a video cassette in public constitutes a performance).
See generally NIMME, supra note 3, § 8.14[A], at 8-182 to -184.
19 Only those performances done publicly are under the control of the copyright holder.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). Performances "at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered" are public performances. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975) ("[N]o license is required by the
Copyright Act, for example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in the shower.").
While there is substantial dispute over the meaning of "public," it is enough to say here
that the copyright holder can control only other people's performances where the performance
is of a public nature and that restaurants, bars, and other retail establishments are public
places. Columbia Pictures was the plaintiff in three cases which have become an instructive-
and intriguing-trilogy. They are the following: Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd
Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that when members of the public rent a
private showroom in a video-rental store and select a movie which is placed in a VCR outside
the showroom by a store employee, the performance of that movie is public); Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that when members
of the public rent a private showroom in a video-rental store and select a movie which is
placed in a VCR inside the showroom and operate the VCR themselves, the performance of
that movie is public); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof. Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866
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performance right extends only to persons who hold copyrights in works which
are capable of being performed. 20 For example, the copyright holder of a
sculptural work is provided with the exclusive right to display the work, but not
with a performance right. Also, the 1976 Act eliminated the 1909 Act's for
profit requirement. 21
Finally, and most important to this Note, the 1976 Act adopted the
"multiple performance doctrine." 22 Two important terms are critical to
F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that when members of the public rent a hotel room in
which there is a television and VCR, rent videocassettes of movies from the hotel, and play
the movies in their room, the performance is not a public performance). For more extensive
coverage of the public component of the performance right, see NIMMER, supra note 3,
§ 8.14[C], at 8-186 to -192.4; Korman, supra note 13, at 521 (extensive discussion of
legislative history); Alan J. Hartnick, Perfornances at Schools and Colleges Under the 1976
CopyrightAct, 8 SErON HALL L. REv. 667 (1977).
20 "[L]iterary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomines, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works" are categories of works which are capable of being
performed. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). Pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, while
copyrightable, are not capable of being "performed," and therefore no performance right is
provided. Instead, these creators are provided with the exclusive right to display the work.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). For extensive coverage of the display right, see NIMMER, supra note
3, § 8.20, at 8-278 to -283.
There is an anomaly in this distinction: the "sound recording" is capable of being
performed, yet a holder of a copyright in a sound recording does not have a perfbrmance
right. "'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101. A copyright in a "sound
recording," distinct from the copyright in the notes or lyrics of a song, protects a "series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds." See 17 U.S.C. § 101. There is substantial debate over
whether the sound recording copyright should include the performance right; however, the
inertia seems to be heading towards recognition of the performance right for sound recording
copyright owners. See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, Im uECruAL PRoPE AND TimE NAnONAL
INFORMAnON INFRASMUCruRE 221 (publication of the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks 1995).
21 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Two reasons are generally cited for the
1976 Copyright Act's abandonment of the "for profit" requirement. First, the distinction
between commercial organizations and nonprofit organizations was often not clear. Second,
many non-profit groups who would be exempt from the need to obtain a license were able to
afford the cost of the license. Nevertheless, the "for profit" limitation is embraced, to an
extent, by the first four subsections of section 110 of the 1976 Copyright Act, which exempts
certain public performances, such as those by religious and educational institutions. See 17
U.S.C. § 110 (1982).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5700-01; see also Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights in the General
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understanding the multiple performance doctrine. First, a transmission from a
radio or television broadcaster is termed a "primary transmission." 23 For
example, WXYZ's broadcast of Don's song was a primary transmission.
Second, the reception and communication of a primary transmission through a
radio or television to listeners or viewers of those particular sets is termed a
"secondary use of a primary transmission."2 4 For example, Kate's act of tuning
her radio to WXYZ to play programming for her customers was a secondary
use of a primary transmission. Under the multiple performance doctrine,25 both
primary transmissions and secondary uses of primary transmissions are deemed
to be perfornances. The primary transmission is deemed by law to be one
performance, and a secondary use of that transmission is deemed a second,
multiple performance. 26 Because secondary uses are deemed to be
performances, they fall within the copyright owner's control through the
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (House
Comm. Print 1965) ("[Plerformance" is defined to "make clear that any further act by which
that initial performance... is transmitted or reproduced constitutes an additional
performance.").
But, curiously, Congress failed to explicitly include "secondary uses of primary
transmissions" within the definition of "performance." See NIMMER, supra note 3, at
§ 8.18[B], at 8-206 to -207.
[The definition of what it is to "perform" does not by its terms appear to go beyond the
"conventional sense" of [perform] so as to include secondary transmissions.... The
definition does not purport to go counter to the "conventional sense" whereby "perform"
does not include the act of picking up a signal off the air, and retransmitting it.
Id.
Nevertheless, the House Report clearly indicates legislative intent to include secondary
transmissions in the definition of "performance." See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676-78; see also supra note 9.
23 This is the same definition as the statutory definition, which states that a "primary
transmission" is "a transmission made to the public by the transmitting facility whose signals
are being received and further transmitted by the secondary transmission service." 17 U.S.C.
§ 111(f) (1982). The House Report explains that "the primary transmitter is the one whose
signals are being picked up and further transmitted by a 'secondary' transmitter." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 87, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5705. See generally NmMER,
supra note 3, § 8.18[C][2], at 8-211.24 This term is not found in the 1976, or any other, Copyright Act.
25 See NIMMR, supra note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-194 to -205.
26 Thus, under the multiple performance doctrine, a single rendition of a work can give
rise to more than one performance. The multiple performance doctrine also has been stated as
follows: "transmission and retransmission of broadcasts [are] 'performances'." SHELDON W.
HAu'ERN Er AL., COPYRIGHT: CAss AND MATERIAlS 231 (1992).
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performance right. Therefore, the multiple performance doctrine requires that
business proprietors obtain licenses for secondary uses of primary
transmissions.
Under the 1976 Act, "any individual is performing whenever he or
she... conmunicate[s] the performance by turning on a receiving set"27-
either a radio or television. The performance is "public" 28 if the establishment
is "open to the public."29 This is how the 1976 Copyright Act adopted the
multiple performance doctrine.30 Thus, under the current law, Kate publicly
performed Don's song because she played it on a radio in an establishment
open to the public. Because the right to publicly perform Don's copyrighted
work belongs exclusively to Don, a performance by Kate without Don's
permission leaves her liable for infringing his copyright.
C. The Section 110(5) Exemption
The current law provides an exemption to the application of the multiple
performance doctrine. 31 Under section 110(5), a proprietor who plays radio or
27 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5669.
28 See a/so 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "publicly").
2 9 See id.
30 Under the current law, "any individual is performing whenever he or
she... communicate[s] the performance by turning on a receiving set." H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5669.
The House Report explains:
Under the definitions... the concepts of public performance and public display cover
not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition
or showing is ... communicated to the public. Thus, for example, any individual is
performing whenever he or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or
communicates the performance by turning on a receiver set.
Id. (emphasis added).
31 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1982). Under § 110(5), the "communication of a
transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the
transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes" is
not a violation of the copyright. See id. The § 110(5) exemption is limited to certain
performances on radio or television, so long as there is no direct charge to see or hear the
performance.
In addition to § 110(5), the performance right is subject to several highly specific
statutory exemptions and compulsory licenses. For a discussion of these exemptions, see
generally NIMMMR, supra note 3, §§ 8.15[B]-[H], 8.18[C], at 8-192.16 to -192.42, -208 to -
221, and of compulsory licenses, see generally Namm, supra note 3, §§ 8.16, 8.17,
8.18[E]-[F], at 8-192.45 to -192.68, -227 to -266.
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television programming for patrons will be relieved of liability--even though
she has publicly performed the work-if the radio or television32 used in the
establishment is a type "commonly used in private homes." 33 The focus of
section 110(5) is the type of equipment used in the establishment. 34 Essentially,
under the section 110(5) exemption, if the radio Kate employs in her restaurant
is the type commonly used in private homes-for example a basic stereo with a
few speakers-she would likely be free of liability. On the other hand, if she
were to use an elaborate system with extraordinarily powerful amplifiers,
receivers, and speakers, she would not fall within the section 110(5) exemption.
Under the current law, if Kate cannot qualify for the section 110(5) exemption,
she will be liable for infringing Don's exclusive performance right.
D. Recent Congressional Activity
Contrary to what was intended, it is now clear that section 110(5) does not
provide effective relief for proprietors from application of the multiple
performance doctrine. 35 The vagueness of what type of equipment is commonly
32 Radios and televisions are referred to in the Copyright Act as "receiving
apparatus[es]." See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
33 See id.
34 Considerations have included square footage, physical arrangement, noise level of the
establishment, and the extent the receiving apparatus is augmented. See Sailor Music v. Gap
Stores, Inc. 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the size of defendant's establishment
was held to justify withholding the exemption even if the nature of the receiving apparatus did
not). Courts have also considered whether the defendant is an individual store or a chain, see
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990), at'd,
949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), and the amount of the establishment's revenue, see Edison
Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
consideration of the amount of revenue runs the risk of violating constitutional principles
against vagueness).
35 Section 110(5) has created extensive problems of statutory interpretation. See
Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (M.D.N.C. 1985)
(speaking of § 110(5), "[t]he meaning of this statutory language is far from clear....");
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 8.18[C, at 8-216 (referring to 110(5) as "vague" and the
application of 110(5) as "speculative"); Paul Warensld, Copyrights and Background Music:
Unplug the Radio Before I Infringe Again, 15 HASMNGs CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 523, 532, 546
(1993) ("[F]rom its inception, the section 110(5) exemption generated an ongoing stream of
litigation" and "[m]ore than fifteen years after its enactment, section 110(5) remains shrouded
in confusion."); John Wilk, Seeing the Words and Hearing the Music: Contradictions in the
Construction of 17 U.S.C. 110(5), 45 RuTGERs L. REV. 783, 841 (1993) ("[S]ection 110(5)'s
statutory and legislative history provisions are expressed in ambiguous and undefined terms.
Consequently, over a decade of litigation has not produced any consensus on what the factors
mean. As interpreted by the courts, the statutory factors are illogical... ."); Maslow, supra
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found in private homes, accompanied by lengthy and confusing legislative
history, 36 makes section 110(5) protection precarious. Hence, section 110(5)
has rightfully been the target of substantial criticism 37 and has spurred Congress
to act. Changes that would replace or supplement section 110(5) have recently
been proposed in Congress.
The "Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1995" 38 was introduced in
Congress to "exempt... small business operators from being charged fees for
playing radios and televisions in their establishments." 39 The exemption would
only apply if the performance is incidental to the main purpose of the
establishment.4 When a restaurant plays a radio for customers, it would
apparently be considered "incidental" to the main purpose of the establishment
since the purpose of the restaurant is to provide food and drink. This is
compared to a sports bar in which showing sporting events on televisions might
not be incidental to the bar's main purpose4' but rather central to its operation.
note 8, at 1058-59 ("[]n spite of the 1976 legislative efforts, however, recent judicial
decisions under the new law indicate that this area of copyright law remains unclear.");
HALPEN Er AL., supra note 26, at 263 (1992) ("[L]itigation over the application of the
section 110(5) is fairly common....").
36 See PATRY, supra note 10, at 917-21.
37 See supra notes 35 and 36.
38 H.R. 789, 103d Cong. (1995). The bill was introduced in the House on February 1,
1995 by Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), who is a member of Congress's subcommittee
on intellectual property. For a summary of the bill, see 7 No. 4 J. PROPR ErARY RTs. (1995).
The bill was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Craig Thomas (R-Wyo.). See generally 49 PAT.
TkADEoMAK & COPYRIGHT J. 442, 452 (BNA 1995); 50 PAT. TRADEMAm & CoPYRGHT J.
421 (BNA 1995).
39 141 CONG. REc. S12079, S12085 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Thomas).
40 In section 2 of the bill, the "communication... of a transmission ... of a work
[where the] reception [is from a] broadcast, cable, satellite, or other transmission" is
exempted. The proposal would severely limit the rights of the performance rights societies.
Performance rights societies are discussed infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. The
amendment also would cut many of the current rights of the performance rights societies. In
section 3, the proposed amendment would subject performance rights societies to binding
arbitration over the fees they charge, would require fee disclosure by the performance rights
societies, and would require that the societies offer licenses on a limited basis in addition to
the blanket, more expensive license it offers now. The proposed amendment would also
require the societies to make annual reports to its licensees and would limit the vicarious
liability of the typical deep-pocket defendants, such as facility owners who merely leased their
property to those who infringed the copyright.
41 Also, "[r]ecords, tapes[,] jukeboxes[,] or video recordings are not covered by [the]
bill." 141 CONG. REc. S12079, S12085 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Thomas
referring to section 2, subsection 5, subpart B of the proposed amendment). The bill,
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The proposed Fairness in Musical Licensing Act awaits further congressional
action.
A second recent congressional proposal is the Right to View Professional
Sports Act, in which a compulsorr license scheme 42 was proposed to increase
public access to sports programming. 43 Under the proposal, all "places of
public accommodation" 44 that provide television broadcasts of professional
sports games would be exempt from copyright infringement if a set fee was
paid to the copyright owner.
A third recent congressional proposal would allow businesses to play music
on televisions and radios without copyright infringement liability if their
establishments are smaller than 5,000 square feet, do not exceed certain income
limits, and use fewer than ten speakers. 45
Finally, a fourth proposal was introduced to exempt "small commercial
establishments," which the Copyright Office may define according to
"specifiable verifiable criteria." 46 Although none of these proposals have
become law,47 their conception indicates that at least some members of
originally introduced in Congress on February 1, 1995, was removed from consideration. The
bill was removed while representatives of the copyright owners and of the restaurant industry
attempted to negotiate an extra-legislative solution to the licensing dilemma. The negotiations
failed to produce an agreement and the bill was reintroduced, again by Rep. Sensenbrenner,
on February 5, 1997 (Sen. Strom Thurmond will introduce the bill in the Senate).
42 A "compulsory license" is a "licensel- created under the Copyright Act to allow
[payors] to make certain uses of copyrighted material without the explicit permission of the
copyright owner, on payment of a specified royalty." BLAcK's LAw DIcIoNARY 288 (6th ed.
1993). It compels copyright owners to grant a license in exchange for a mandatory, set fee.
For a critique of the use of compulsory licenses, see Cote, supra note 9, at 219.
43 See 139 CoNG. REc. H230 (daily ed. May 5, 1993) (statement of Rep. Lipinski,
House sponsor, introducing the Right to View Professional Sports Act of 1993). For a
summary of the bill, see Legislation: Bill Would Create Compulsory Licensing System for TV
Sports in Public Places, 46 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYmGHT J. 32 (BNA 1993). See also
National Football League v. McBee & Brunno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)
(deciding that sporting events are copyrightable if a recording is made by the copyright owner
simultaneous to the telecast).
44 "Places of public accommodation" are defined broadly as any "inn, hotel, motel, or
other place of lodging, or a restaurant, bar, or other commercial establishment serving food or
drink." 139 CONG. REc. El173 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Rep. Lipinski).
45 See CONG. REC. S2423 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Rep. Brown).
46 See CONG. REC. S1619 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch). This
proposal was introduced by Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). See 49 PAT. TRADmIARK
& COPYRIGHT J. 731 (BNA 1995).
47 See supra note 40 and accompanying text for the Fairness in Musical Licensing Act
and supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for the Right to View Professional Sports Act.
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Congress are ready to respond to the problem presented by the multiple
performance doctrine and the troublesome section 110(5) exemption.
LI. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE CURRENT LAW: WHY CHANGE IS
NEEDED
This Part of the Note discusses the problematic results of adoption of the
multiple performance doctrine. The problems resulting from the multiple
performance doctrine are distinguishable from the problems of section 110(5),
which have been extensively discussed elsewhere.48 While the problems arising
from the multiple performance doctrine have been explored by the Supreme
Court, neither Congress nor commentators have made the multiple performance
doctrine itself the subject of criticism. This Note follows the Supreme Court's
lead in identifying the multiple performance doctrine-not section 110(5)-as
the root of the problem. Many of the difficulties discussed in this Part were
highlighted by the Supreme Court in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken49-the case in which the Court rejected the multiple performance
doctrine.
A. The Constitutional Balance
According to the United States Constitution, copyright law must "promote
the progress of... useful Arts."50 To satisfy this purpose, 5' copyright law
48 See supra note 35.
49 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
50 The Patent and Copyright Clause states: "Trhe Congress shall have the Power] to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsr.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a discussion of the etiology of the copyright clause, see Oman, supra
note 10, at 85.
Congress and the courts have given "writings" extremely broad meaning. "[C]ongress
very properly has declared [writings] to include all forms of writing, printing, engraving,
etching... by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression."
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884); see also STAFF OF
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATs., TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG. Isr SEss., THE
MEANING OF "WRrINGs" IN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OF THE CONsTr ON 61 (Subcomm.
Print 1960) (stating that the terms of the clause were intentionally left vague so that Congress
would be free to expand the common law).
51 "To promote the progress of science and useful arts" must be read as a preamble
indicating the purpose of the power. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172
U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a'd by
an equaly divided courtper cuuiam, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
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seeks to balance two competing interests. 52 On one hand, the law must
encourage and reward creative efforts of authors.53 On the other hand, the law
must assure public access to creative works. Encouraging creative efforts of
authors is achieved "by granting [authors] the right to exclude others from
certain uses of the copyrighted work." 54 To satisfy the need for public
accessibility, 55 copyright law sets limits on the author's interest.56 That is, the
author's control over her work is not limitless. 57
52 Also, Congress noted:
[Ihe main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to music has
been to give to the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition, and it
has been a serious and a difficult task to combine the protection of the composer with the
protection of the public, and to so frame an Act that would accomplish the double
purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return for all use made of his
composition and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, which
might be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the purpose of
protecting his interests.
H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("ITihe
limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration
required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest."); Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) ("[lo function properly, copyright law must strike a balance
between the rights given to copyright authors and the access given to copyright users.").
53 The term "author," taken from the Copyright and Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, is given extremely broad meaning: "An author in [the constitutional] sense is 'he
to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or
literature.' Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57-58.
54 Janice E. Oakes, Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where Lies the
Public Interest?, 59 TuL. L. REv. 135, 135 (1984); see also Kreiss, supra note 52, at 14
("Mhe economic rewards of the marketplace are offered to authors in order to stimulate them
to produce and disseminate new works. The mechanism is the granting of exclusive rights to
authors with regard to their works.").
55 The requirement of access to creative works by the public is important to this Note. In
the end, the Note should make it clear that the current law fails to adequately satisfy this
requirement. For a consistent but broader view of contemporary copyright law's failure to
consider public accessibility to copyrighted works, see Kreiss, supra note 52, at 2-3
("[W]hile the accessibility of a work should be of central importance to copyright theory, its
role in that theory is more often assumed than carefully discussed by courts or
commentators.").
56 A durational limit is constitutionally mandated. U.S. CoNs'r, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57 See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 155 ("[T]he Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder
control over all uses of his copyrighted work.") (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists,
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Copyright laws must be analyzed against the backdrop of these interwoven
but competing interests. Laws must be geared toward offering sufficient
incentive for authors, 58 while maintaining an adequate amount of public
accessibility. In the end, though, "the primary object in conferring the
[copyright] lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors." 59 Unfortunately, though, "[w]hile the accessibility of a work should
be of central importance to copyright theory, its role in that theory is more
often assumed than carefully discussed by courts or commentators. " 6
The current law is an example of assuming the accessibility of a work. The
current law fails to establish the delicate equilibrium between encouraging
creative endeavors and assuring public access to creative works, especially in
light of copyright law's ultimate aim.61 Under the current scheme, the public's
access is too limited. This criticism is not intended to assert that authors do not
deserve compensation. To deny authors financial compensation would stifle the
arts by drying up a substantial incentive to create; 62 no one will pay the author
for use of her work if the public already has cost-free access to it.63 To force
the members of the public to make payments to authors, the public's access
must be limited. Nevertheless, the current law overcompensates the author in
the form of an overbroad public performance right that greatly reduces public
access far below the level needed to ensure sufficient compensation.
392 U.S. 390, 393 (1967)); Oman, supra note 10, at 93 ("[C]ongress has whittled away at the
exclusivity of the right."); Shipley, supra note 1, at 515 ("[C]opyright is not... a complete
monopoly.").
58 It is acknowledged that authors create for reasons other than money. See generally
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNrCA Art Exhibitions and Art Sales 131 (15th ed. 1991) (citing
sociological, psychological, political, economic, and aesthetic factors which urge artistic
creativity).
59 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (emphasis added); see also
Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic
philosophy behind the [copyright] clause is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare .... "); Kendall v. Winsor,
62 U.S. 322 (1858); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 217 (1832); Kreiss, supra note 52, at 6 (The
primary goal of copyright is "to encourage the widest possible production and dissemination
of literary, musical and artistic works."). See generally L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY W.
LINDBERG, TiE NATuRE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS (1991); Margaret Chon,
Postmodem "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAuL L.
REV. 97 (1993).
60 Kreiss, supra note 52, at 2-3.
61 See supra note 50-52 and accompanying text.
62 See supra note 59.
63 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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The current system can be described as "quid pro quo out of balance." 64
This unwanted result is reached when "the author obtains the economic benefit
that the copyright system was designed to give to authors, but the public does
not receive the public benefit that was intended." 65 Using the hypothetical, Don
obtained the intended economic benefit from the licensing fee he received from
WXYZ. However, the public does not receive the full benefit it was intended to
receive because Kate may choose to keep her radio turned off instead of paying
for a license that would allow her to play the radio for her patrons. This limits
public availability for those who are in Kate's restaurant, or any other
establishment, despite the economic benefit the copyright system has already
provided Don.
B. Collecting Fees: Once Is Enough
The multiple performance doctrine can also be attacked from a purely
economic perspective. The Supreme Court concluded that the multiple
performance doctrine, which requires that business proprietors obtain licenses
for secondary uses of primary transmissions, "authorize[s] the sale of an untold
number of licenses ... [and] [t]he exaction of such multiple tribute... go[es]
far beyond what is required for the economic protection of copyright
owners. "6 A copyright owner is adequately compensated for her work through
the licensing fee she receives from the radio or television broadcaster.67 This
fee is enough to encourage and reward creative effort. 68 The "double-dipping
[the multiple performance doctrine allows] smacks of unfairness."69 Also,
because some businesses cannot or will not obtain a license, public availability
is sacrificed since radios and televisions will be turned off.70
64 Kreiss, supra note 52, at 20-22.
65 1d. at22.
66 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162-63 (1975). The Court
observed that copyright owners received royalties from broadcasters in proportion to the
listening audience and were, therefore, adequately compensated. See id. at 163 n.14. For
more extensive discussion of the licensing arrangement, see infra text accompanying notes
168-76.67 SeeAiken, 422 U.S. at 163.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 168-71 for discussion of economic ramifications.
69 This statement was contained in Sen. Brown's introductory remarks. See 142 CONG.
REc. S2423 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Sen. Brown).70 The broadcasters are also paying the cost of this double-licensing scheme. Radio
broadcasters pay the performance rights societies based on the expected size of their
audiences. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. The expected audience size
includes those people who are in commercial establishments which are playing the broadcast.
Let us say the expected audience is 150,000, 10,000 of whom are in commercial
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C. It Is Already Public
The multiple performance doctrine fails to make a distinction between a
primary transmission-which typically reaches an extremely large audience-
and a secondary use of that transmission in a commercial establishment, which
typically reaches only a few people. Under the 1976 Act's multiple
performance doctrine, they are treated equally, despite the much more
extensive scope of the primary transmission.
Recognizing that primary transmissions do have much greater reach, courts
prior to the 1976 Act reasoned that by licensing the primary transmission the
copyright owner willingly offers her work to the entire public, including those
in commercial establishments. 71 Thus, the license obtained for the primary
transmission should eliminate the need for a license for the secondary use of
that primary transmission.72 Once a copyright owner agrees to license her work
establishments spread throughout the geographic area. Under the current scheme, each
establishment's proprietor pays the copyright owner a licensing fee to allow the proprietor to
play the broadcast for its patrons-a total of 10,000 of them. Therefore, 10,000 of the
station's 150,000 listeners are already "paid for." Nevertheless, the station must count those
10,000 listeners among its audience when calculating the performance rights society's royalty.
For a more thorough discussion of the system of licensing and royalties, see infra text
accompanying notes 168-71.
71 See Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 412
(6th Cir. 1925) ("Radio broadcasting is intended to, and in fact does, reach a very much
larger number of the public at the moment of the rendition than any other medium of
performance.").
72 One court observed that when a copyright holder licenses a broadcaster to play a
song, she impliedly "sanction[s] and consent[s] to any [reception] that [is] possible." Buck v.
Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929). The defendant in another case argued that
"since the transmitting of a musical composition by a commercial broadcasting station is a
public performance... control of the [primary transmission] exhausts the monopolies
conferred." Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. 191, 197 (1931). These cases and others are
discussed more fully below. See iufra Part IV.
Courts have also expressed this concept in terms of a "sublicense." The license the
copyright holder grants the broadcaster has an "implied in law" sublicense. The sublicense
permits secondary uses of the primary transmission. The Supreme Court acknowledged the
possible acceptance of this argument. See Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 199 n.5. "[W]e have no
occasion," the Court wrote, "to determine.., the effect upon others of [a broadcaster]
paying a license fee." Id. at 198 (emphasis added). The Court continued: "If the copyrighted
composition had been broadcast by [the defendant] with plaintiffs consent, a license for its
commercial [use] might possibly have been implied." Id. at 199 n.5; see also Sid Marcovitch,
On Aiken, Performance and the 110(5) Exemption: Is There a Gap in the Court's Thinking?,
11 W. ST. U. L. REv. 129, 136 (1983) ("If Aiken has any chance of making a comeback, it
will be on the basis of this special breed of sublicense.").
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for broadcast, her fee has been paid, her control has been asserted, her rights
have been observed, and the law does her no favor by preventing broadcasts of
her song from being freely played in commercial establishments. 73
D. "Practical Unenforcibility"
Continuing with the problems of the multiple performance doctrine, "[o]ne
has only to consider the countless business establishments in this country with
radio or television sets on their premises... to realize the total futility of any
evenhanded effort on the part of copyright holders to license even a substantial
percentage of them." 74 It is simply impractical to require so many businesses,
which are constantly opening and closing doors and changing ownership, to
enter into licensing agreements. 75
Furthermore, paraphrasing the Supreme Court,76 even if a proprietor were
to obtain a license to perform copyrighted works, she would have no way of
knowing whether a radio or television broadcast she is playing for her
customers includes the work of one whose copyright was held by someone
other than the licensor. 77 Under the current scheme this scenario is inevitable
and leaves even the most cautious proprietor liable for infringement. This
73 Copyright owners will in fact benefit financially from allowing proprietors to freely
play radio and television programming for customers because, in the end, copyright owner's
royalties increase when the expected size of the audience hearing the broadcast increases. The
expected number of audience members includes those listeners or viewers in commercial
establishments. For a more thorough discussion of this result, see infra notes 168-71 and
accompanying text.
74 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162 (1975); see also
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 528-
29 (1945) (characterizing the multiple performance doctrine as creating a rule "which is very
hard for laymen to apply").
75 See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162. While § 110(5) would prevent infringement for some of
these businesses, proprietors will not know who they ae, and even if they did, they would not
have the confidence that their receiving sets would pass the ever-changing tests of what are
"commonly found in homes." See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
76 See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162-63.
77 See id.; Marcovith, supra note 72, at 133 ("Granted, the chances are remote that any
song would be played which would not fall under the licensing control of either ASCAP or
BMI, but nevertheless, all that it would take is one song to constitute infringement.. ").
But see Jewell-LaSale, 283 U.S. at 198-99 (holding that when one turns on his radio or




scenario also highlights the fact that a business proprietor has no control over
what is being played, yet he may be held liable because it was played. 78
E. Confusing to Proprietors
The multiple performance doctrine requires that business proprietors obtain
a license in order to play radios or televisions for patrons, unless they can
qualify for the section 110(5) exemption. However, proprietors are generally
unaware of the need for a license79 or of the need to consult a copyright
attorney. Propretors are unlikely to know8 0 that the law distinguishes between
equipment commonly used in private homes and other, more elaborate systems.
Even if they were informed of the law, they would still question why "a bar
with one 27" television does not need a license, while another bar with two 13"
televisions does?" 81 To ambush proprietors with charges of copyright
infringement under this furtive system is simply unfair.82
78 Similarly, the Supreme Court reasoned that the proprietor was merely a "passive
listener" and not a peformer. The "passivity" rationale is that a business proprietor's
secondary transmission is a largely passive act of turning on a radio and is not a performance.
This rationale was first seen in Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F.2d
829, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) ("Certainly those who listen do not perform, and therefore do not
infringe."). See also Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398-
99 (1968) ("[Viewers do not perform. Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial
roles in the total television process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as active
performer; the other, as passive beneficiary."); Aiken, 422 U.S. at 159. In Aiken, Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, maintained that one who listened to a broadcast, like a
member of a live audience, did not perform the work. See id. Also, according to the Aiken
Court, "picking up radio signals off the air and transmitting them through radio speakers
simply did not constitute a 'performance,' and hence need not be licensed." NMER, supra
note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-203 to -204.
79 See Litman, supra note 2, at 49. "The music performing rights societies have been
trying to educate a recalcitrant public for the past eighty years, and the effort has hardly made
a dent in the psyches of their customers or the people who patronize them." Id.
80 Nor is it clear that anyone knows how a court will apply § 110(5). See supra note 35.
81 Litman, supra note 2, at 49-50 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)). "Copyright lawyers
might understand that the reason for this is that the words in section 110(5) say 'single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes,' but there is nothing
intuitively appealing about the distinction." Id.; see also Shipley, supra note 1, at 476 ("The
law must seem arbitrary to people like Joe," a fictional business proprietor.).
82 In 1929, one court prophetically wrote that the adoption of the multiple performance
doctrine "would be harmful, unnecessary, and would lead to endless confusion and disorder."
Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1929). There are complaints that "businesses
are often threatened with legal action or harassed for doing something they did not realize was
against the law." 141 CONG. REc. S12085 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen.
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F. Secondary Uses of Primary Transmissions Are "Remote and
Minimal"
The multiple performance doctrine is bad policy for yet another reason:
merely turning on an ordinary receiver in public is an insignificant event.
Congress has already acknowledged that "[tjhe basic rationale of [section
110(5)] is that the secondary use of the [primary] transmission by turning on an
ordinary receiver in public is so remote and minimal that no further liability
should be imposed." 83 Even if a business employs televisions larger or speakers
louder than types "commonly used in private homes," 84 the secondary use is
just as "remote and minimal." The audience in commercial establishments is
generally small. There is no expense placed on the copyright holder because
secondary uses are mere fleeting sounds and images; patrons are seeing or
hearing programming that they could see or hear at home, in their cars, or
virtually anywhere through portable radios or televisions without any additional
payment to the copyright owner. Secondary transmissions are too remote and
minimal to really matter.
G. Performance Rights Societies Regulate the Industry
Performance rights societies85-which arrived on the scene in 1914-are
important players in the economic worth of the performance right. As a
practical matter, individual copyright owners are incapable of controlling or
Thomas); see also 7 No. 4 J. PROPRMTARY RTS. 32, 32 (1995) ("In a congressional hearing
held last year, witnesses complained of the music licensing practices of performing rights
societies... [that] used pressure tactics to collect fees.").
83 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5700.
84 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1982).
85 Performance rights societies are expressly recognized by the 1976 Copyright Act See
17 U.S.C. § 116(e)(3) (1982) (defining performing rights society). For a general account of
the role of performance rights societies, see NumMER, supra note 3, § 8.19, at 8-267 to -277.
The three most prominent performance rights societies are American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music Inc. (BM1), and Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC). For an explanation of the history of ASCAP and
BMI and an discussion of their roles, see generally RAtPH S. BaowN & ROBERT C.
DEmCOLA, CAsEs ON CoPYRIGHT, UNFAm COMPErrTON, AND OTmER ToPIcs BEARING ON
THE PROTECTON OF LrrERARY, MusicAL AND ARTnC WoRKs 470-75 (5th ed. 1990);
Kemochan, supra note 13, at 333. Also see the seminal antitrust case of Broadcast Music Inc.
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (holding that ASCAP's and BMI's
licensing methods are not forbidden by antitrust laws).
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tracking unauthorized public performances of their work.86 Performance rights
societies do this for the individual copyright owners. Societies obtain non-
exclusive licenses from copyright owners and, in turn, license individual
businesses for the right to play the copyrighted works.87 The performance
rights societies are the middlemen:8-and policemen 89-between copyright
owners and individual licensees.
The current scheme bestows excessive power on performance rights
societies.90 The scheme compels businesses nationwide to either obtain licenses
from performance rights societies or keep their radios and televisions off.
Because of their expertise 9' and financial resources, when a society
representative sits down with a business owner, the society dominates the
bargaining table. This disparity has led to unfair practices. Licensing "fees are
charged in a confusing or ambiguous manner, without any oversight or
control[]. " 92 There are also complaints that "businesses are often threatened
with legal action93 or harassed for doing something they did not realize was
against the law." 94 The current scheme begets this disparity.
86 See BrodMasMic, 441 U.S. at 4-5.
In 1914, Victor Herbert and a handful of other composers organized ASCAP [the first
performance rights society] because those who performed copyrighted music for profit
were so numerous and widespread, and most performances so fleeting, that as a practical
matter it was impossible for the many individual copyright owners to... detect
unauthorized uses [of their works].
Id.
87 See generally BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 85.
88 "ASCAP was organized as a 'clearing-house' for copyright owners and users to solve
[the] problems [associated with the licensing of music]." Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
American Society of Composers, 400 F. Supp 737, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
8 9 Employees of the performance rights society typically enter an unlicensed
establishment and listen to what music is played. The songs played are then checked against
the society's repertoire of music over which it holds licenses. If a listed song is played and the
establishment is not properly licensed, a cause of action for infringement arises.
90 The Fairness in Musical Licensing Act was aimed at reducing the powers of the
performance rights societies. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text
91 In 1984, ASCAP attorneys were involved in 751 actions. The majority of these were
"infringement suits against non-broadcaster commercial users (taverns, bars, restaurants,
shops, etc.) who resist[ed] licensing." Kernochan, supra note 13, at 373.
92 141 CONG. REc. S12085 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Thomas).
93 
"[M]any of those who buy performing rights licenses from [societies] say that they do
so only because they are afraid of the copyright police." Litman, supra note 2, at 48.
94 141 CONG. REC. S12085 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Thomas); see
also 7 No. 4 J. PROPP-'rARY Rrs. 32, 32 (1995) ("In a congressional hearing held last year,
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H. Fairness for Copyright Owners
The primary argument made by copyright owners in support of the multiple
performance doctrine is that the music belongs to them and it is unfair to allow
retail establishments to play copyrighted works without paying. 95 It has been
asserted that restaurateurs who fail to obtain a license are stealing the music.96
This argument fails to address the policy behind copyright law's ultimate aim of
benefiting the public. Copyright law is not driven by exacting profits from all
uses of a copyrighted work; the law's purpose is not to facilitate the sale of the
copyright owner's product. Copyright law is driven by the purpose of
"promoting the... useful arts." 97 The arts are promoted by public access as
long as incentives exists for authors, the obligation of encouraging creative
efforts is satisfied; therefore, public accessibility must be favored. 98 The
copyright inquiry does not ask whether each particular use has been paid for,
but whether the author has been adequately compensated. 99 With regard to the
performance right, the condition of adequate compensation is met: copyright
owners receive licensing fees for the primary transmission and they also benefit
from the larger audience created when their works are played in commercial
establishments. 100 Also, any indirect profit a proprietor might make from
playing her radio is negligible and incalculable. Customers are paying for food,
not to hear the music, and to force a proprietor to pay for what she might not
be getting is unfair.
IV. DEFINING "PERFORMANCE": MOvING TOWARDS A SOLUTION
It appears that few, if any, proponents of the status quo remain.101 The safe
haven of section 110(5) is intended to protect proprietors from the application
witnesses complained of the music licensing practices of performing rights societies... that
used pressure tactics to collect fees."). For more statements by bar and restaurant owners, see
Music Licensing Practices of Perforning Rights Societies: Oversight Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Adin. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 23-24, 1994).
95 See HAuERNEr AL., supra note 26, at 236.
9 6 See Litnan, supra note 2, at 49.
97 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
9 8 See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
99 While the distinction between facilitating sales and assuring adequate compensation is
subtle, it is enough to disavow the view that every use of a cop3righted work requires
payment.
100 See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 168-71 and
accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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of the multiple performance doctrine, but it is actually a dark back alley-
unpredictable and unsafe. In working toward a solution, members of
Congress' °2 and various critics I03 have focused on the section 110(5)
exemption to the multiple performance doctrine-suggestions and attempts are
constantly made to adjust section 110(5) to make it more user-friendly. 104 Even
the most recent congressional proposals are merely attempts to carve yet more
exemptions to favor a particular niche of proprietors. Such proposals simply do
not reach the heart of the problem.
The real culprit is the rule itself, not the exemption. The problems of the
current system 05 have been caused by the implementation of the multiple
performance doctrine,1° 6 and the 110(5) sideshow107 has become a distraction.
Little attention has been given to the fact that the Supreme Court has rejected
the multiple performance doctrine.108 It is frequently written that the Supreme
Court created an exemption to the multiple performance doctrine.109 However,
as this Note clarifies, the Court did not create an exemption to the doctrine, but
simply rejected it.11o Also rarely mentioned is the fact that Congress brought
the doctrine back to life based on purblind readings of the Court's decisions.
The remainder of this Note deals with the Court's rejection of the multiple
performance doctrine, Congress's misinterpretation of those decisions, and how
those decisions can guide a redefinition of what it means to perform a
copyrighted work to solve the problems of the current law."'
102 See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See supra Part Ill, where the problems of the current system are detailed.
106 Under the current scheme, Don, as the copyright owner, has the right to control
Kate's and other's secondary uses of the primary transmission, because those secondary uses
fall within the definition of performance. It is clear then that the breadth of the performance
right is determined by the definition of performance. Also important to this analysis is the
definition of public. That discussion, though, is beyond the scope of this Note. For helpful
sources, see supra note 19.
107 See supra note 35.
108 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160-61 (1975)
("C his Court has... explicitly disavowed the view that the reception of an electronic
broadcast can constitute a performance, when the broadcaster [of the primary transmission] is
licensed to perform the copyrighted material that he broadcasts."). For a thorough discussion
of the Aiken case, see infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
109 See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
110 See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
I11 "With the advent of the technological revolution, the courts have had to define and
redefine the word 'performance' within the context of both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright
Acts." Marcovitch, supra note 72, at 129. Copyright owners argue for a broad definition of
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A. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.
Beginning in 1926, each court which considered the issue of secondary
uses of primary transmissions held that the secondary uses were not
performances.1 12 In Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 113 though, the Supreme
Court appeared to have set aside this earlier line of cases. The accepted rule of
Jewell-LaSalle1 14 was that a secondary use of a primary transmission was a
performance.1 15 In rejecting the pre-Jewell-LaSalle cases, Justice Brandeis
reasoned that a broadcast creates inaudible sound waves which travel through
the air and are received and made audible by the radio.1 16 According to the
Court, this was a reproduction of the work and therefore a performance. 117
performance, one which includes secondary uses of primary transmissions, usually with a
performance rights society representing the litigant. Business owners argue for a narrower
definition of performance, one that does not include secondary uses. The current statutory
definition of perform is the broader version; it includes secondary uses.
112 See, e.g., Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929) (holding that when a
restaurant receives a primary transmission from a broadcaster and plays the song for its
customers that secondary use is covered under the license obtained by the radio station for the
primary transmission); Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929) (deciding that the
mere act of receiving what is in the air cannot be a performance); Jerome H. Remick & Co.
v. General Electric Co., 16 F.2d 829, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (stating that those who listen to a
radio broadcast do not perform the work).
One who manually or by human agency merely actuates electrical instrumentalities,
whereby inaudible elements that are omnipresent in the air are made audible to persons
who are within hearing, does not "perform" within the meaning of the Copyright Law.
The performance in ... [these] case[s] takes place in the studio of the broadcasting
station ....
DeBawn, 40 F.2d at 735. Gene Buck was the president of ASCAP during the 1920s and
1930s.
113 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
114 In a decision in 1975, forty-four years after Jewell-LaSalle, the Supreme Court
clarified what Jewell-Loae was meant to stand for. See infra notes 119-24 and
accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
116 See Jewell-LaSlle, 283 U.S. at 200-01.
117 See id. at 201. As a result of Jewell-LoSalle, proprietors of commercial
establishments who played radios or televisions became a new class of potential copyright
infringers, giving rise to what one author called "multiple copyright liability" theory. See
Maslow, supra note 8, at 1061. Because the proprietors were now performing when they
played radios or televisions for patrons, their acts fell within the copyright owners' control;
the copyright owners could exact licensing fees from them.
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However, the Jewell-LaSalle Court indicated twice in its opinion that the
defendant might not have been liable if the primary transmission had been
licensed.118
B. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken
On its face, Jewell-LaSalle may have appeared to have adopted the multiple
performance doctrine because both the primary transmission and the secondary
uses of that primary transmission were found to be performances.' 1 9 But in
1975,120 the Supreme Court made it clear that it was improper to read Jewell-
LaSalle as fully adopting the multiple performance doctrine.121 The facts of
Aiken are paradigmatic of secondary use cases.' 22 Aiken, the defendant,
operated "George Aiken's Chicken," a fast-food restaurant equipped with a
radio and four speakers installed in the ceiling. Aiken regularly tuned into local
radio stations for the benefit of his employees and customers. A number of the
plaintiffs' copyrighted songs 2 3 were played by a licensed radio station, of
which Aiken provided a secondary transmission for his customers and
employees. Claiming that Aiken was engaged in a performance, the plaintiffs
sued for copyright infringement.' 24
118 "[We have no occasion," the Court wrote, "to determine... the effect upon others
of [a broadcaster] paying a license fee." Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
The Court continued: "If the copyrighted composition had been broadcast by [the defendant]
with plaintiffs' consent, a license for its commercial [use] might possibly have been implied."
Jewell-LoSalle, 283 U.S. at 199 n.5.
119 See Jewell- aqale, 283 U.S. at 191.
120 
"Despite its analytical inadequacies, the Jewell-LaSalle doctrine went unchallenged
for many years." NmM , supra note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-196.12 1 Many view Aiken as virtually overruling Jewell-LaSalle. See, e.g., Namm, supra
note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-204 ("[While Aiken almost totally undercut Jewell-LaSalle, it did not
quite overrule it."); Aiken, 422 U.S. at 166 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Today ... the
Court... effectively overrules Jewell-LaSalle .... "). The proper reading of the two cases,
though, reveals that Aiken did not overrule or even criticize Jewell-LaSalle. Instead, the two
are entirely consistent. Aiken merely reemphasized what the Court held in Jewell-LaSalle;
namely, that if the secondary use is of a !icensed primary transmission, then the multiple
performance doctrine does not apply.
122 All facts are taken from Aiken, 422 U.S. at 152-54.
123 The songs were "The More I See You," copyrighted by Twentieth Century Music
Corp., and "Me and My Shadow," copyrighted by Mary Bourne. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at
152-53.
124 The district court found Aiken liable and awarded statutory damages for each
infringement. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp 271 (W.D. Pa.
1973). On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, relying on Fortnightly and Teleprompter. See
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In Aiken, 125 the Supreme Court made it clear that Jewell-LaSalle was not
an adoption of the multiple performance doctrine. The Court explained that its
opinion in Jewell-LaSalle clearly emphasized the fact that the primary
transmission in that case was not licensed. 126 Thus, a proper reading of Jewell-
Laale must include the qualification that while a proprietor's secondary use of
an unlicensed primary transmission will be deemed a performance of the work,
a proprietor's secondary use of a licensed primary transmission, according to
the Court, might not be a performance.' 27 In other words, the multiple
performance doctrine would only apply where the secondary use was of an
unlicensed primary transmission.1 28 Returning to the introductory hypothetical,
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 133-37 (3d Cir. 1974), atd, 422
U.S. 151 (1975). For a discussion of these two cases, see infra note 125.
125 The Aiken decision was based, in part, on two previous Supreme Court cases:
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 392 (1968) (holding that under
the 1909 Act, where members of a community are connected by cable to a powerful antenna,
which picked up television signals from local stations and sent the signal to the homes, the
transmission from the antenna to the homes through the cable is not a performance) and
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (holding that where
defendants b-ing distant signals to subscribers' homes by the use of powerful antennas, there
is no performance). The Aiken Court characterized these two decisions as "disavow[ing] the
view that the reception of an electronic broadcast can constitute a performance, when the
broadcaster himself is licensed to perform the copyrighted material that he broadcasts."
Aiken, 422 U.S. at 161. However, the Court wrote, "[tlo hold that ... Aiken 'performed' the
[songs]... would more than offend the principles of stare decisis; it would result in a regime
of copyright law that would be both wholly unenforceable and highly inequitable." Aiken, 422
U.S. at 162; see NMMER, sipra note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-203 ("IT]he decisions in Fortnightly
and Teleprompter effectively foreclosed application of the multiple performancedoctrine. .... ").
126 See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 160 (citing Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 198, 199 n.5); see
supra note 118 and accompanying text; see also Maslow, supra note 8, at 1067 ("[D]ictum in
Jewell-LaSalle recognized a distinction between authorized and unauthorized broadcasts.").
127 "We may assume for present purposes that the Jewell-LaSalle decision retains
authoritative force in a factual situation like that in which it arose." Aiken, 422 U.S. at 160;
see also NnpIME, supra note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-204 (After Aiken, "[a]t most, then, Jewell-
LaSalle remained authoritative to permit a finding of a multiple performance by a broadcast
receiver only when the broadcasting station was itself unlicensed to perform the work in
question.") (emphasis added). Compare Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 407 n.5 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he term 'perform' cannot logically turn on the question whether the material
that is used is licensed or not licensed.").
128 "But even this small residue of Jewell-LaSalle became most questionable." NnImME,
supra note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-204. How a proprietor would be able to discern whether a radio
or television station was properly licensed would be a major obstacle to application of this
rule. Moreover, this situation would rarely arise. Broadcasters are highly sensitive to proper
licensing because it is an integral part of their business.
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if Aiken were the current law, and assuming the radio station, WXYZ, was
properly licensed, Kate would not be liable for infringing Don's copyright
because Kate's secondary use of WXYZ's licensed primary transmission would
not be deemed a performance.
After Aiken, the doctrine of multiple performances was for all practical
purposes dead; 129 however, the law of the performance right quickly changed
from rejection of the multiple performance doctrine in Aiken to adoption of the
multiple performance doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act.130 The two were
clearly at odds.
C. Congress and Jewell-LaSalle
Congress asserted that its adoption of the doctrine of multiple performances
was supported by Jewell-LaSalle131 and that the section 110(5) exemption was
an answer to Aiken.132 Congress's misunderstanding of what these two cases
stood for has led the doctrine down the wrong path-through the doors of
commercial establishments.
Congress misread Jewell-LaSalle as extending liability to any business
establishment that operates a radio or television set for the entertainment of its
patrons.' 33 That interpretation lacked reference to the important qualification
that the Jewell-LaSalle Court established and that the Aiken Court
emphasized.'34 Under Jewell-LaSalle, the multiple performance doctrine was
alive only when the proprietor's secondary use was of an unlicensed primary
transmission. The 1976 Act, though, imposes liability on the proprietor without
regard to whether or not the primary transmission is licensed. Congress's
adoption of the multiple performance doctrine, therefore, cannot be supported
129 At the most, the multiple performance doctrine was alive only for secondary uses of
unlicensed primary transmissions. The Aiken Court "all but sounded the death knell of the
multiple performance doctrine." NMMER, supra note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-203. The Jewell-
LaSal/e situation will rarely arise because performance licenses are so fundamentally a part of
the business for radio and television broadcasting. See Shipley, supra note 1, at 483 (After
Aiken, "Jewell-aSaUe had become a decision with a very limited impact.").
130 See Shipley, supra note 1, at 483 ("[Ihe demise of Jewell-LaSalle was... short-
lived.-).
131 When drafting the 1976 Act, Congress purported to "accept[] the traditional, pre-
Aiken, interpretation of the Jewell-LaSaUe decision." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701.
132 The 1976 Copyright Act claimed to be incorporating Aiken into section 110(5). The
House Report states that performances in the particular fact situations in Aiken would be
exempt under section 110(5), but that this would be the "outer limit of the exemption."
133 See supra note 131.
134 See supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
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by Jewell-LaSalle, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's statements in
Aiken.
D. Congress and Aiken
Section 110(5) has been labeled the "Aiken exemption." 135 However, the
two are hardly alike. 136 Aiken was a complete rejection of the multiple
performance doctrine, 137 while section 110(5) is merely a narrow exemption to
it.
In addition to the case's and the exemption's very different meanings,
Congress's failure to account for Aiken can be shown convincingly by
examining the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act. 138 Despite the
extensive judicial and academic ink section 110(5) has harnessed, 139 it is hardly
recognized that section 110(5)-the so-called "Aiken exemption-was drafted
ten years before Aiken was decided. 140 Between the Aiken decision on June 17,
135 See Little Mole Music v. Mavar's Supermarket, Nos. C86-3129Y, C87-1865Y,
1988 WL 167243, at *5 (N.D. Ohio 1988) ("[C]ongress codified the Aiken exemption in
section 110(5) of the Act."); Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp 1113,
1115 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (stating incorrectly that "[iln 1976, primarily as a result of [Aiken],
Congress enacted section 110(5)"); NmnMER, supra note 3, § 8.18[C][2], at 8-211; Robert A.
Feitel, Copyright Misuse and Cable Television: Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 35
FED. COMM. L.J. 347, 368 n.118 (1984) (citing 110(5) as the "statutory codification of the
Aiken performance exception"); Shipley, supra note 1 (referring throughout to 110(5) as the
Aiken exception); Wilk, supra note 35, at 808 (referring to 110(5) as the Aiken exemption).136 See Maslow, supra note 8, at 1094 ("[Ain interpretation of section 110(5) which
limits the exemption's application [only] to an establishment like the one in
Aiken's... apparently subverts one of the major policies behind copyright law: the
promotion and maximization of public dissemination of information and art for the general
public good.").
137 A ruling that all of those in Aiken's position are copyright infringers "would result in
a regime of copyright law that would be both wholly unenforceable and highly inequitable."
Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162; see also NnAER, supra note 3, § 8.18[A], at 8-203 ("[Ihe
decisions in Fortnightly and Teleprompter effectively foreclosed application of the multiple
performance doctrine. .. ").138 See PATRY, supra note 10, at 917-21.
139 See supra note 35. One writer who did recognize this sequence of events is PATRY,
supra note 10, at 917. "[A]Ithough Section 110(5) is usually discussed in connection with the
Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Twentieth Centuy Music Corp. v. Aiken, its origins lie in
[Congress]." Id.
140 See S. REP. No. 89-1006 § 109(4) (1965); H.R. REP. No. 89-4347, § 109(4) (1965).
The 1965 proposed revision stated:
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1975 and the enactment of 110(5) on October 19, 1976, Congress made no
changes to section 110(5). 141 Despite Aiken's rejection of the multiple
performance doctrine, section 110(5)'s allegiance to the doctrine, by creating
only a narrow exemption to it, remained unchanged. 142 Section 110(5), which
pre-dates Aiken, ignores, rather than resolves, 143 the policy considerations upon
which Aiken is bottomed.
Congress also sought to justify its adoption of a much diluted version of
Aiken by asserting that Aiken was based on the narrower definition of perform
in the 1909 Copyright Act. 144 However, Aiken was based on policy, not
statutory interpretation or construction.145 The policy arguments which
persuaded the Aiken Court to reject the multiple performance doctrine
transgress whichever definition Congress chose to include in the 1976
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not infringements of
copyright:
(7) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or exhibition of a work
by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind
commonly used in private homes, unless:
(a) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(b) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public.
Id.
Except for the use of "display" in the 1976 Act (instead of "exhibition"), this 1965
proposal is identical to section 110(5) of the 1976 Act. Note that section 110(5) was enacted in
1976, a year after Aiken was decided.
141 For additional commentary on this legislative history, see PATRY, supra note 10, at
917-21.142 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
14 3 See supra Part III.
144 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 86, 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5700-01.
145 The majority opinion in Aiken consists of twenty paragraphs. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at
152-64. Four of them are devoted to the facts of the case, two are statements of general
copyright law, five discuss the apposite law, and nine of those twenty-two paragraphs,
including the last four, are devoted to discussing policy issues.
The Court stated that the multiple performance doctrine conflicts with the balanced
purpose of the Copyright Act "of securing to the composer an adequate return for [the value]
of his composition and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies."
Aiken, 422 U.S. at 164. Also, "the policy reasons which gave birth to Aiken still make a great
deal of sense." Marcovitch, supra note 72, at 136.
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Copyright Act. 146 Contrary to what was asserted in Congress, 147 the basis for
the Aiken decision is not "completely overturned" 148 merely by Congress's
broad definition of perform in the 1976 Act.
E. Policymaking
Admittedly, Congress is free, and perhaps duty bound,149 to make its own
decisions between competing policy interests, such as the copyright owners'
rights versus the public's right to access copyrighted works. Congress's
autonomy is to be respected. Congress is not restricted by the principles of stare
decisis, 150 nor are congressmen and congresswomen incompetent to decide
these issues. This Note's reliance on Aiken as a rejection of the multiple
performance doctrine is predicated on the opinion being a clear statement by the
country's high court. While Aiken is not a badge of authority that can be used to
compel Congress to adopt the Court's ruling, it is persuasive authority that
copyright law cannot afford to ignore. 151
146 The Aiken Court was well aware of the proposed copyright revisions adopting the
multiple performance doctrine, but the Court nonetheless defined performance narrowly,
despite the proposed revisions. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 166 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting the treatment of secondary transmissions of radio broadcafts by recent congressional
proposals).
147 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5701. "The Copyright Office took the position that the basis for the Aiken decision-that no
'performance' occurred-'would be completely overturned by the revision bill,' and thus
there was no necessity for amending the bill." Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R.
223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1811 (1975).
148 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
149 But see Deanell R. Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52
OHIo ST. L.J. 279, 284 (1991) (quoting THE FEDERAmSr No. 48, at 343 (James Madison)
(B. Wright ed. 1961)). "For Madison... separation of powers did not mean complete
isolation between the three branches: Unless the departments are connected and blended, the
degree of separation... essential to a free government... can never in practice be duly
maintained." Id.
150 See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional
Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TnM. L. REv. 425, 426 (1992)
("[W]hen the United States Supreme Court interprets a federal statute in a manner repugnant
to Congress, the latter may respond by legislatively modifying the statute in accordance with
its intentions.").
151 See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text; cf. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 168 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihe issue presented can only be resolved appropriately by the
Congress.").
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Finally, while legislative history reveals scant evidence that Congress
considered the issues raised in Aiken, 152 even if one were to assume that there
was full blown debate on the floors of the House and Senate, the fact is that the
result reached by the current system is inadequate. The policy concerns,
stridently raised in Aiken, remain unresolved under the current scheme. 153 The
problems caused by the implementation of the multiple performance doctrine
persist. 154
F. The Solution: Redefine the Term "Perform"
Commentators, courts, and at least some members of Congress 155 agree
that the multiple performance doctrine with today's narrow section 110(5)
exemption makes for an inadequate system.' 56 Congress can right its wrong
readings of the Supreme Court cases, and rectify the problems, 157 by simply
doing away with the doctrine of multiple performances.
An adequate result can be achieved by rewriting the statutory definition of
performance to exclude a business proprietor's secondary use of a primary
transmission.' 58 The definition proposed by this Note is the addition of the
following underlined language to the current definition of perform at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101:
152 See PAnTY, supra note 10, at 921 (providing a detailed account of the legislative
history); see also supra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
153 See supra Part m]J.
154 Congress adopted the very doctrine the Supreme Court deemed unenforceable and
inequitable. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162.
155 See supra notes 35, 38-47 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text. Also, the original "purpose [of the
performance right] was to prohibit unauthorized performances of copyrighted musical
compositions in such public places as concert halls, theaters, restaurants and cabarets." Aiken,
422 U.S. at 157 (citing H.R. No. 60-2222 (1909)). "But it was never contemplated that the
members of the audience who heard the composition would themselves also be simultaneously
'performing,' and thus also guilty of infringement." Aiken, 422 U.S. at 157.
157 See supra Part M.
158 See Kernochan, supra note 13, at 362 n.64. Professor Nimmer suggests that the
possibility remains that a court, convinced as a matter of policy that secondary uses of
primary transmissions should not be subject to copyright, might reject the multiple
performance doctrine on the grounds that secondary uses of primary transmissions are not
expressly included within the statutory definition of performance, despite the fact that
Congress made clear that it intended to include secondary transmissions. A court could reason
that legislative history can be used to interpret statutory language, but not to change it. "Such
a court might choose to follow... the 'conventional sense' of the word 'performance' which
would not include [secondary] uses of primary transmissions." NPMMER, supra note 3,
§ 8.18[B], at 8-208.
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To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either
directly or by means of any device or process, other than by a radio or
television tuned to a primary transmission.
In other words, a radio or television tuned to a primary licensed
transmission 159 is not a performance. Under this narrow definition only the
primary transmission would be a performance, thus finally and forever
defeating the problematic multiple performance doctrine and the 110(5)
sideshow.
With this definition, Kate would be free to tune into radio programming
without infringing Don's copyright because by playing the radio she would not
be performing his work. 160 This result strikes the proper balance between
encouraging creative efforts and assuring public access to copyrighted works.
This narrow definition of performance maintains the financial incentive' 6' for
authors because they would still be paid a licensing fee by broadcasters for the
primary transmission. 162 Also, freeing proprietors to play radio and television
programming would increase public accessibility, which is the "ultimate
aim" 163 of and "of central importance to copyright theory. - 164
Returning to the narrow definition of performance would also make for a
more efficient system. It would eliminate proprietors' confusion, 165 the
practical problems of requiring so many businesses to obtain licenses, 166 and
the strong hold that performance rights societies have on proprietors. Also, the
need for application of the vexatious 110(5) exemption 67 would be obviated
because proprietors would not be performing when they played radio or
television programming.
159 The term "primary transmission" is defined in the 1976 Copyright Act, see supra
notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
160 "[I1f an unlicensed use of a copyrighted work does not conflict with an 'exclusive'
right conferred by the statute, it is no infringement of the holder's rights." Aiken, 422 U.S. at
155. Under my proposed definition, Kate's radio use is not a performance and therefore does
not conflict with any of Don's exclusive rights.
161 See supra note 59.
162 The financial incentive might be increased. See infra notes 170-71 and
accompanying text.
163 SeeAiken, 422 U.S. at 156.
164 See Kreiss, supra note 52, at 3; Marcovitch, supra note 72, at 134 (agreeing with the
primary significance of public access). "[P]erhaps the greatest public policy reason which
justifies Aiken is the flmdamental purpose of the Copyright Act in promoting the public
interest in the development of the arts and sciences." Id.
165 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text
167 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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Finally, returning to the narrow definition will be profitable for copyright
owners.168 At first glance, the economic effect on copyright owner's of
returning to the narrow definition of performance-that secondary uses of
primary transmissions are not performances-might appear to reduce the
authors' compensation because business proprietors would no longer pay them
licensing fees. That treasure trove would be shut. However, looking at the
method by which stations are licensed, it is clear that authors would benefit
financially, not suffer, from implementation of the narrow definition of
performance. 169
The system works like this: the amount of the fee advertisers pay
broadcasters is based on the expected number of total listeners or viewers of the
broadcast, including those listeners and viewers in public establishments. 170 If
licenses were unnecessary, more proprietors would furnish their establishments
with radio or televisions and tune into programming. In turn, this would create
larger audiences of the broadcasts. The larger the audience, the larger is the
radio station's advertising revenues, and the larger the license royalties are for
copyright holders. 171 Therefore, copyright owners would benefit financially
from freeing business proprietors to play radios and televisions.
One result of adopting the proposed definition would be to exempt large
establishments, which traditionally have not been thought to need or deserve
such an exemption.' 72 The thinking has been that larger establishments are
likely to have people who know that the establishment needs a license and to
have the resources to be able to afford one. With the rejection of the multiple
performance doctrine, which is proposed here, no establishment would be
168 See supra note 50-65 and accompanying text. However, the benefits that society
derives from hearing music or seeing programs in commercial establishments and an artist's
reduction or abstention from creative output are not monetary in nature and are, therefore,
difficult or impossible to fit into an economic formula. See generally William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325
(1989).
169 Note that consumers would also benefit financially because another palpable cost to
society of the current system is the increased prices of goods and services resulting from
businesses passing the license fees to consumers.
170 See L. James Juliano, Jr., Performers' Rights Under the General Revision of
Copyright Law, 28 CASE W. RFs. L. REv. 766, 780 (1976) (explaining that "the size of the
audience determines how much [the radio broadcaster] can charge for advertisers").
171 For a detailed discussion of the procedure that performing rights societies use to
assure the copyright holder accurate compensation, see Herman Finkelstein, ASCAP as an
Example of the Clearing House System in Operation, 14 BuLL. CopRGrr Soc'Y 2 (1966);
see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 158 (1975).
172 Large businesses are excluded from 110(5) protection because more than ordinary
home equipment is needed to make the sounds or images available to customers.
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deemed to be performing through the use of radios or televisions, without
regard to its size or its main purpose.173 Nonetheless, all the reasons that work
to prevent small businesses from being liable for copyright infringement for
simply flicking on the power button to radios or televisions174 apply to larger
establishments who likewise should not be subject to liability. Extending the
exemption to larger establishments is justified by the alleviation of the practical
and fairness problems detailed above in Part m and by the fact that copyright
owners will still be paid for the primary transmission. Extension of the
exemption to all establishments without regard to size is also justifiable in light
of the favor placed on the public's access over copyright owner's control. 175
In sum, the legion of ills caused by the multiple performance doctrine can
be cured by simply redefining performance so as not to include secondary uses
of primary transmissions. Kate's and Don's day could end happily. Kate would
be free to play her radio for customers, and Don would benefit from the larger
audience176 that Kate creates.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress's incorporation of the multiple performance doctrine into the
1976 Copyright Act has led the performance right scheme askew. The doctrine
fails to reach the proper balance between encouraging creative efforts of
authors and assuring public accessibility. The current system results in an
impractical and inequitable system. 177 A solution can be achieved by redefining
performance so that a proprietor is not performing works by playing a radio or
television for patrons.178 The problems caused by the current scheme can be
alleviated, and the proper balance between the incentive to create and assuring
173 For example, even a sports bar with several large screen televisions would be free to
play television programming without a need to obtain a license. The argument would be made
that the bar is profiting from the games it shows. When placed in constitutional water, though,
this view fails to float. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.174 See supra Part I.
175 See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 155-76 and accompanying text for a proposal of a new definition.
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public availability can be reached. Congress just needs to finally follow the
Supreme Court's lead and eliminate the multiple performance doctrine. 17 9
179 1 am not the first in this area of the law to make this plea. See, e.g., Warenski, supra
note 35, at 546. But see Oman, supra note 10, at 98 (stating that copyright clauses "will dog
us for another two hundred years, as the 'charter for a living people'").
Finally, the entertainment industry has a great stake in the scope of the performance right.
The broader the right is, the more it is worth. Not surprisingly, the entertainment industry is
among the top three financial contributors to congressmen and congresswomen. Additionally,
of the top four individual contributors, two are from the entertainment industry-Time Warner
and Walt Disney Co. See LARRY MAmNSON, OPEN SEC]RE: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CONGREssiONAL MONEY AND PoLrcs, 26-27 (2d ed. 1992).
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